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THINKING OUTSIDE THE BOX: REFORMING
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION DOCTRINE
TO COMBAT THE NEGATIVE CONSEQUENCES
OF BAN-THE-BOX LEGISLATION
Nina Kucharczyk*
As part of the larger movement to reform the criminal justice system,
legislation has recently been implemented to expand job opportunities for
formerly incarcerated individuals as they exit the system. Specifically, “banthe-box” laws were passed to reduce widespread employment discrimination
that formerly incarcerated individuals encounter by limiting employers’
access to criminal records. While this legislation has increased job
opportunities for formerly incarcerated individuals, it has had an impactful
and unintended consequence in that employers use the applicant’s race in
place of records to assume whether or not a criminal record may exist.
Consequently, racial minorities without criminal records are facing
heightened discrimination in jurisdictions with ban-the-box laws.
To make matters worse, current employment discrimination laws fail to
provide relief for job applicants who suspect discrimination in the hiring
process. As such, there is minimal legal recourse for racial minorities facing
discrimination due to the ban-the-box laws and no incentive for employers to
end discriminatory practices.
This Note suggests a new approach to address the unintended
consequences of ban-the-box legislation.
The solution to combat
unconscious discrimination during the hiring process is not to eliminate banthe-box laws entirely; instead, lawmakers must modernize and strengthen
employment discrimination doctrine to empower racial minorities who
suspect discrimination and to ensure employers are critically analyzing their
hiring processes.

* J.D. Candidate, 2018, Fordham University School of Law; B.A., 2013, Harvard College. I
would like to thank Professor Tanya K. Hernández, Professor John Pfaff, and Elizabeth Slater
for their valuable guidance throughout the process. I would also like to thank the editors and
staff of the Fordham Law Review for their assistance and my family for their constant support.
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INTRODUCTION
Collateral consequences, such as the loss of employment opportunities,
punish formerly incarcerated individuals beyond their imprisonment.1
Importantly, many of these collateral consequences increase recidivism, as
individuals who cannot find employment and stable housing are more likely
to return to prison.2 Problematically, research overwhelmingly shows that
formerly incarcerated individuals face significant employment
discrimination.3 The impact of this discrimination is extensive: as of July
2015, approximately seventy million Americans have criminal records—
roughly the same number as Americans with degrees from four-year
colleges.4 Moreover, criminal-record rates are much higher in African
American and Latino populations, resulting in an additional impediment for
individuals who may also face racial discrimination.5 To seriously reduce
the current recidivism rate,6 employment opportunities for formerly
incarcerated individuals must increase.
Legislation has emerged in response to this dire problem. Specifically,
many states have enacted “ban-the-box” legislation that prohibits certain
employers from inquiring about a job applicant’s criminal record during the
initial application process.7 Unfortunately, while this legislation aimed to
increase employment for formerly incarcerated individuals, there has been a
negative unintended consequence for minorities without a criminal record:

1. There are almost 50,000 federal and state statutes that impose penalties, disabilities,
or disadvantages on convicted felons after they are released from prison. See generally
National Inventory of the Collateral Consequences of Conviction, COUNCIL ST. GOVERMENTS
JUST. CTR., https://niccc.csgjusticecenter.org/ (last visited Apr. 14, 2017) [https://perma.cc/
7XPQ-L6DV].
2. See Joan Petersilia, Community Corrections: Probation, Parole and Prisoner
Reentry, in CRIME AND PUBLIC POLICY 499, 519 (James Q. Wilson & Joan Petersilia eds., 2011)
(noting that a meta-analysis of over 400 studies shows that employment was the single most
effective factor in reducing reoffending rates); see also Thomas P. Lebel & Shadd Maruna,
Life on the Outside: Transitioning from Prison to the Community, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK
OF SENTENCING AND CORRECTIONS 657, 661–63 (Joan Petersilia & Kevin R. Reitz eds., 2012)
(noting that finding employment and stable housing after release are among the strongest
inhibitors of reincarceration).
3. See Lebel & Maruna, supra note 2, at 661–63; see also Petersilia, supra note 2, at
518–19.
4. Matthew Friedman, Just Facts: As Many Americans Have Criminal Records as
College Diplomas, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (Nov. 17, 2015), https://www.brennancenter.org/
blog/just-facts-many-americans-have-criminal-records-college-diplomas [https://perma.cc/K
A9T-HK3Y].
5. See THOMAS P. BONCZAR, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PREVALENCE OF IMPRISONMENT IN
THE U.S. POPULATION, 1974–2001, at 1 (2003), http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/
piusp01.pdf [https://perma.cc/4MEQ-8T44]. Approximately 5.9 percent of white men are
expected to go to prison in their lifetimes, compared with 17.2 percent of Hispanic men and
32.2 percent of African American men. See id.
6. According to a recent study, roughly 68 percent of released prisoners are arrested
within three years of release. See MATTHEW R. DUROSE ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
RECIDIVISM OF PRISONERS RELEASED IN 30 STATES IN 2005: PATTERNS FROM 2005 TO 2010,
at 1 (2014), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/rprts05p0510.pdf [https://perma.cc/2QTGL5MT].
7. See infra Part I.A.
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employers unable to see criminal histories assume minority applicants have
a criminal record and stop hiring minorities altogether.8
Now, lawmakers must balance the goals of ban-the-box legislation to
increase employment opportunities for formerly incarcerated individuals
with the reality that this legislation may unintentionally incentivize
employers to discriminate more against minority men without criminal
records. This balancing act is especially challenging because minority
applicants without criminal records have dismal prospects of winning
employment discrimination lawsuits and, therefore, have minimal access to
legal relief.9
However, if employment discrimination doctrine is
strengthened and adapted to the current realities of discrimination, such as
the prevalence of implicit bias, it may be possible to maintain ban-the-box
laws and also provide legal remedies to minority job applicants who suspect
they have been discriminated against.10 Moreover, the threat of an effective
lawsuit will force more employers to proactively consider how unconscious
discrimination affects their hiring decisions and ultimately increase the
number of minorities hired.11
Part I of this Note discusses ban-the-box laws that seek to reduce
employment discrimination for formerly incarcerated individuals and the
consequences of these laws on all minority job applicants. Then, Part I
synthesizes the legal options for rejected job applicants who believe they
were discriminated against in the hiring process. Next, Part II compares the
two analytical frameworks used to evaluate evidence of bias in employment
discrimination claims. While one framework has the potential to provide
relief for plaintiffs alleging unconscious discrimination, the other leaves no
room to consider the role of implicit bias, leading to vastly different
outcomes. Finally, Part III argues that the solution to the increase in racial
discrimination due to ban-the-box laws is not to remove this legislation.
Rather, the unintended consequence of ban-the-box laws should motivate
change to current employment discrimination doctrine. Specifically, courts
should adopt the mixed-motive framework—a more lenient evidentiary
analysis—and the government should strengthen its commitment to
collecting employment data. Stronger employment discrimination laws will
empower plaintiffs to bring lawsuits that have a higher chance of success and
deter employers from discriminating against applicants based on unconscious
stereotypes about the criminal propensities of racial minorities.

8. See Amanda Agan & Sonja Starr, Ban the Box, Criminal Records and Statistical
Discrimination: A Field Experiment 2 (Univ. Mich. Law & Econ. Research, Paper No. 16012, 2016), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2795795 [https://perma.cc/H7K9-Z6QZ]; Jennifer L.
Doleac & Benjamin Hansen, Does “Ban the Box” Help or Hurt Low-Skilled Workers?:
Statistical Discrimination and Employment Outcomes When Criminal Histories Are Hidden 8
(Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 22469, 2016).
9. See infra Part II.A.
10. See infra Part III.A.
11. See infra Part III.B.2.
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I. BANNING THE BOX TO ADDRESS HIRING DISCRIMINATION
This part discusses the recent wave of ban-the-box legislation
implemented to address the hiring discrimination of formerly incarcerated
individuals. First, this part examines ban-the-box legislation, including its
goals, its characteristics, and its variations from state to state. Next, this part
outlines the positive and negative effects ban-the-box laws have on hiring
discrimination, including studies that suggest these laws have decreased job
opportunities for minority males without criminal histories. Lastly, this part
details the basic judicial remedies available to job applicants that suspect an
employer failed to hire them because of discrimination.
A. Ban-the-Box Legislation
This section provides information about ban-the-box laws, including the
background of ban the box, the legislative aims, the differences between
states’ laws, and the studied effects of the legislation.
1. Background
The negative effects of a criminal conviction on employment opportunities
have become increasingly severe.12 More professions are requiring
background checks and clean criminal records than ever before.13
Additionally, technology has made it easier for employers to access criminal
records.14 This push to increase background checks has proven problematic
for many formerly incarcerated individuals; a 2015 report noted men with
criminal records account for 34 percent of unemployed men of prime
working age.15
To address the debilitating effects of a criminal conviction, federal and
state legislatures have enacted numerous policies to attempt to open the
workplace to formerly incarcerated individuals.16 Recently, a new category
of employment discrimination legislation has become popular: ban-the-box
laws.17 Although the language varies, this legislation generally prohibits
12. See Petersilia, supra note 2, at 518.
13. See id. To make matters worse, the industries that are expanding, such as health
care, education, and security, are exactly the industries that prohibit the employment of
formerly incarcerated individuals. Id.; see also U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS,
CURRENT EMPLOYMENT STATISTICS HIGHLIGHTS (2017), http://www.bls.gov/web/empsit/
ceshighlights.pdf (“Health care has added 374,000 jobs over the past 12 months.”)
[https://perma.cc/U8M7-3JUF].
14. See Doleac & Hansen, supra note 8, at 8.
15. Binyamin Appelbaum, Out of Trouble, but Criminal Records Keep Men out of Work,
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 28, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/01/business/out-of-troublebut-criminal-records-keep-men-out-of-work.html?_r=1 (“The reluctance of employers to hire
people with criminal records . . . is preventing millions of American men from becoming, in
that old phrase, productive members of society.”) [https://perma.cc/88ZY-JHJN].
16. See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 378-2.5 (West 1998); KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 335B.020 (West 1978); N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 752 (McKinney 2007).
17. See generally MICHELLE NATIVIDAD RODRIGUEZ & BETH AVERY, NAT’L EMP’T LAW
PROJECT, BAN THE BOX: U.S. CITIES, COUNTIES, AND STATES ADOPT FAIR-CHANCE POLICIES
TO ADVANCE EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES FOR PEOPLE WITH PAST CONVICTIONS (2017),
http://www.nelp.org/content/uploads/Ban-the-Box-Fair-Chance-State-and-Local-Guide.pdf
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certain employers from asking applicants about their criminal history on their
initial job application.18 The “box” refers to the question on a job application
that asks if the applicant has ever been convicted of a crime, which the
applicant answers by checking either the “yes” or “no” box.19
Currently, a total of twenty-five states and the District of Columbia have
adopted ban-the-box legislation.20 Furthermore, more than 150 cities and
counties have also banned the box, including populous cities such as New
York City and San Francisco.21
2. The Goals of Ban-the-Box Legislation
Ban-the-box laws were passed to achieve two main goals.22 First, these
laws strive to increase employment outcomes for individuals with criminal
histories.23 The laws target the initial hiring process because criminal records
have been shown to reduce the likelihood of a job applicant receiving an
initial callback.24 One study demonstrated that for white formerly
incarcerated males, criminal records reduce their callback chances by about
50 percent.25 The effect was more pronounced for black males. The study
found that only 5 percent of formerly incarcerated African American males
received callbacks, compared to 14 percent of their counterparts without
criminal records.26
Advocates of ban-the-box legislation assert that if employers are forced to
evaluate the employability of the applicant instead of making stereotypical
judgments, formerly incarcerated individuals will be hired more often.27
While announcing the executive branch’s ban-the-box policy, President
Obama reiterated this principle to a group of prisoners, saying, “If
[employers] have a chance to at least meet you, . . . you’re able to talk to them
about your life, what you’ve done, maybe they give you a chance.”28
Second, these laws are intended to counter the deterrent effect of the box
on a job application.29 One formerly incarcerated individual said that when
(outlining the states and cities that have recently passed ban-the-box legislation)
[https://perma.cc/PX65-HLHJ].
18. See Doleac & Hansen, supra note 8, at 4.
19. See id. at 10.
20. See RODRIGUEZ & AVERY, supra note 17, at 1.
21. See id. at 2.
22. Johnathan J. Smith, Banning the Box but Keeping the Discrimination?: Disparate
Impact and Employers’ Overreliance on Criminal Background Checks, 49 HARV. C.R.-C.L.
L. REV. 197, 211 (2014) (analyzing how disparate impact doctrine has been ineffective in
protecting individuals with criminal backgrounds in the job market).
23. See id.
24. Devah Pager, The Mark of a Criminal Record, 108 AM. J. SOC. 937, 955 (2003)
(finding that 34 percent of white males without criminal records received callbacks, compared
to 17 percent of white males with criminal records).
25. See id.
26. Id. at 957–58 (“The effect of race in these findings is strikingly large.”).
27. See Jessica S. Henry & James B. Jacobs, Ban the Box to Promote Ex-Offender
Employment, 6 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 755, 757 (2007).
28. Ari Melber, Obama Bans the Box, MSNBC (Nov. 2, 2015), http://
www.msnbc.com/msnbc/obama-bans-the-box [https://perma.cc/U9AH-HQZ9].
29. See Henry & Jacobs, supra note 27, at 757.
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she saw the “have you ever been convicted of a crime?” question on an
application, she felt like the “air went out of [her] tires.”30 She knew that
checking “yes” would essentially disqualify her from the job.31 Ban-the-box
advocates hope that more formerly incarcerated individuals will submit job
applications if the question is removed from the initial application, resulting
in an increased employment rate for these applicants.32
3. Relevant Laws and Distinctions
Ban-the-box legislation varies notably from state to state in three main
ways: (1) the types of employers and jobs covered, (2) the stage of the hiring
process in which employers can inquire about criminal history, and (3) the
existence of additional requirements on how criminal records can be used
when making an employment decision.33
First, while some states have enacted legislation that covers both public
and private employment,34 other state laws address only public
employment.35 Out of the twenty-five states that have ban-the-box
legislation, only nine states passed laws that apply to both public and private
employers.36 Most state laws cover only public employers, such as
government agencies, but have no effect on private companies.37
Additionally, states have exemptions for certain jobs ranging from law
enforcement officers to barbers. For instance, Louisiana’s legislation
exempts any position where the law requires a background check38 and
restricts employment licenses for a wide range of fields.39 Most commonly,
states have restrictions on jobs that involve caring for children or the
elderly.40
Second, states differ as to when an employer may ask a job applicant about
his criminal record. For example, some states require that an employer wait
until a conditional offer is made.41 Then, the employer can withdraw the
offer if a criminal record is uncovered.42 In Rhode Island and Maryland,
30. Lydia DePillis, Millions of Ex-Cons Still Can’t Get Jobs. Here’s How the White
House Could Help Fix That, WASH. POST (Jan. 22, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
news/storyline/wp/2015/01/22/millions-of-ex-cons-still-cant-get-jobs-heres-how-the-whitehouse-could-help-fix-that/ [https://perma.cc/UN69-VWMQ].
31. See id.
32. See Smith, supra note 22, at 211.
33. For a more detailed discussion of the differences in ban-the-box legislation, see
Christina O’Connell, Ban the Box: A Call to the Federal Government to Recognize a New
Form of Employment Discrimination, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 2801 (2015).
34. Public employment tends to cover state, city, and district jobs and may also include
government agencies; private employment refers to private companies. See id. at 2820–21.
35. See RODRIGUEZ & AVERY, supra note 17, at 6–14.
36. See id. These states are Connecticut, Hawaii, Illinois, Massachusetts, Minnesota, New
Jersey, Oregon, Rhode Island, and Vermont. See id.
37. See id.
38. See LA. STAT. ANN. § 42:1701 (2016).
39. See id. § 37:2950 (exempting licensing agencies for education, physical therapy,
architects, funeral directors, and more).
40. See O’Connell, supra note 33, at 2807.
41. See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 378-2.5 (West 1998).
42. Id.
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employers must wait until the first interview to inquire, either orally or in
writing, whether the applicant has ever been arrested, charged with, or
convicted of any crime.43 However, some statutes give employers more
flexibility about when they can request information about the applicant’s
criminal history.44 For example, New Jersey’s vague statute does not allow
an employer to make any inquiries about the applicant’s criminal record
during the “initial employment application process.”45
Finally, some states provide additional protection for convicted criminals
and require that the conviction have a “direct” or “rational” relationship to
the position applied for.46 In Hawaii, for example, both public and private
employers are prohibited from inquiring about criminal convictions until
after a conditional offer has been extended.47 Then, the offer can be
rescinded only if the potential employee’s conviction record “bears a rational
relationship to the duties and responsibilities of the position.”48 Additionally,
Virginia’s executive order declares that state employment decisions cannot
be based on criminal records unless those decisions are “demonstrably jobrelated and consistent with business necessity.”49 In contrast, other states
have no relatedness requirement so it is entirely lawful for an employer to
reject the applicant due to his criminal record, even when the applicant’s
conviction record has no bearing on his ability to do the job.50
4. Effects of Ban-the-Box Legislation
Although ban-the-box laws are relatively new, some scholars have
researched the effects of this legislation on various states and cities where the
laws were enacted. This subsection outlines recent studies on the
effectiveness and consequences of ban-the-box legislation.

43. See MD. CODE ANN., STATE PERS. & PENS. § 2-203 (West 2013); 28 R.I. GEN. LAWS
ANN. § 28-5-7 (West 2013).
44. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:6B-14 (West 2014).
45. Id.
46. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 24-5-101 (West 2012); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 378-2.5; MINN. STAT. ANN. § 364.03 (West 2013). In addition to state laws, the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) has also recommended that inquiries about
convictions be “limited to convictions for which exclusion would be job related for the
position in question and consistent with business necessity.” See U.S. EQUAL EMP’T
OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE NO. 915.002, CONSIDERATION OF ARREST
AND CONVICTION RECORDS IN EMPLOYMENT DECISIONS UNDER TITLE VII OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS
ACT OF 1964, at 14 (2012).
47. See HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 378-2.5.
48. Id. Colorado requires a “direct relationship” between the conviction and the job. See
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 24-5-101.
49. 31 Va. Reg. Regs. 1451 (Apr. 20, 2015).
50. See RODRIGUEZ & AVERY, supra note 17, at 14–15 (outlining a complete list of states
with ban-the-box laws and relatedness requirements).
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a. Positive Outcomes
Ban-the-box laws have succeeded in increasing callback and employment
rates for formerly incarcerated individuals in many places.51 For example,
since the start of the ban-the-box initiative, the number of formerly
incarcerated individuals hired by the city of Durham in North Carolina has
increased sevenfold, from 2.25 percent of city employees having criminal
histories in 2011 to 15.53 percent in 2014.52 In the District of Columbia, the
number of applicants with records increased both numerically and as a
percentage of all hires after the law took effect.53 After the law, there was a
33 percent increase in the number of applicants with records hired, which
resulted in 21 percent of all new hires in D.C. being people with criminal
records.54
Furthermore, there is promising research demonstrating that an increase in
employment opportunities for formerly incarcerated individuals has a
positive effect on society as a whole. Economists believe that hiring
individuals with criminal histories benefits the job market and the economy
generally.55 Employing formerly incarcerated individuals can also reduce
costs for society because employment has been shown to reduce recidivism.56
b. Inefficiencies
Politicians and criminal justice reform advocates have largely lauded banthe-box legislation and view these laws as an important step to aiding

51. For a summary of multiple studies on the effectiveness of ban-the-box laws, see
ANASTASIA CHRISTMAN & MICHELLE N. RODRIGUEZ, NAT’L EMP’T LAW PROJECT, RESEARCH
SUPPORTS FAIR-CHANCE POLICIES (2016), http://www.nelp.org/content/uploads/Fair-ChanceBan-the-Box-Research.pdf [https://perma.cc/BLD5-HTZA].
52. DARYL V. ATKINSON & KATHLEEN LOCKWOOD, S. COAL. FOR SOC. JUSTICE,
THE BENEFITS OF BAN THE BOX:
A CASE STUDY OF DURHAM, NC (2014),
http://www.southerncoalition.org/program-areas/criminal-justice/ban-the-box-communityinitiative-guide/benefits-ban-box/ [https://perma.cc/77G6-CPLM].
53. OFFICE OF THE D.C. AUDITOR, THE IMPACT OF “BAN THE BOX” IN THE DISTRICT OF
COLUMBIA 17 (2016), http://www.dcauditor.org/sites/default/files/FCRSA%20-%20Ban%
20the%20Box%20Report_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/4C82-FKVD].
54. See id. It is important to note that the District of Columbia enacted a comprehensive
ban-the-box law that only permits an employer to reject a job applicant with a criminal record
for a “legitimate business reason.” D.C. CODE ANN. § 32-1342 (West 2014). The statute
outlines six factors to consider including the specific duties of the employment, the fitness and
ability of the applicant to perform those duties given the nature of the offense, the age of the
applicant at the time of the offense, and the time elapsed since the occurrence of the offense.
See id.
55. See ALAN BARBER & CHERRIE BUCKNOR, CTR. FOR ECON. & POLICY RESEARCH, THE
PRICE WE PAY: ECONOMIC COSTS OF BARRIERS TO EMPLOYMENT FOR FORMER PRISONERS AND
PEOPLE CONVICTED OF FELONIES 1 (2016), http://cepr.net/images/stories/reports/employmentprisoners-felonies-2016-06.pdf?v=5 (“In terms of the cost to the economy as a whole,
[research] suggests a loss of about $78 to $87 billion in annual [gross domestic product].”)
[https://perma.cc/XX37-8QEV].
56. See Mark T. Berg & Beth M. Huebner, Reentry and the Ties That Bind: An
Examination of Social Ties, Employment, and Recidivism, 28 JUST. Q. 382, 396–405 (2011).
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prisoner reentry.57 However, ban-the-box laws have also been criticized.58
First, these laws are less effective on a national level because the current laws
assist only a small number of people.59 More than half of the states do not
have any ban-the-box laws and, in the states that do have them, many
employers are not required to follow them because of the numerous
exceptions commonly laid out by state legislators.60 Additionally, many
critics of ban-the-box legislation feel that this legislation does not stop
discrimination but instead just delays the hiring process.61 After waiting to
inquire about criminal history, many employers still do not end up hiring the
applicant when his conviction record is exposed, which is inefficient and
costly to the employer.62
These problems do not present a fatal flaw to ban-the-box legislation. If
ban-the-box laws are continually praised by the executive branch, then other
politicians, larger companies, and more employers who are not legally bound
to eliminate the question on their job applications may choose to do so
voluntarily.63 Furthermore, while the laws may cause some delays and added
costs in the hiring process, these limitations must be balanced with the strong
interest in increasing employment for formerly incarcerated individuals.
c. Racial Discrimination
Ban-the-box legislation, however, faces a more detrimental critique that
undermines its very objective. While the purpose of ban-the-box laws is to
expand access to employment for all formerly incarcerated individuals,
recent studies have shown that these laws may in fact decrease employment
access for black and Hispanic men.64
One recent study, conducted by Amanda Agan and Sonja Starr, found that
ban-the-box legislation results in statistically significant racial discrimination
against black males.65 The researchers sent approximately 15,000 job
57. President Obama was a tremendous advocate of ban-the-box legislation. See Melber,
supra note 28.
58. See Smith, supra note 22, at 216–18.
59. See id. at 216.
60. See id.
61. See Juanita Duggan, Opinion, Ban the Box Ignores Employers’ Legitimate Concerns,
N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 13, 2016, 3:21 AM), http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2016/04/13/
should-a-jail-record-be-an-employers-first-impression/ban-the-box-ignores-employerslegitimate-concerns (“An owner may spend weeks into the hiring process only to find a worker
is disqualified because of his record. Lost time is lost income.”) [https://perma.cc/6B6Y4FQC].
62. See id.
63. See, e.g., Mark Holden, Opinion, Employers Should Decide on Their Own to Ban the
Box, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 13, 2016, 3:21 AM), http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2016/
04/13/should-a-jail-record-be-an-employers-first-impression/employers-should-decide-ontheir-own-to-ban-the-box (noting the positive effects of banning the box on Koch Industries’s
workforce and encouraging other employers to follow suit) [https://perma.cc/DR86-HXH7].
64. See Ben Leubsdorf, ‘Ban the Box’ Laws May Worsen Hiring Discrimination, New
Research Finds, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 3, 2016), http://www.wsj.com/articles/ban-the-box-lawsmay-worsen-hiring-discrimination-new-research-finds-1475520896 [https://perma.cc/J5H4JJB2].
65. See Agan & Starr, supra note 8.
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applications with “racially distinctive” names in New York and New Jersey
before and after the implementation of the ban-the-box policy.66 These
applications were sent in pairs; the paired applicants had the same credentials
and criminal records but different names—one with a typically white name
and one with a typically black name.67 The authors found that before the
legislation was enacted and employers could freely ask about criminal
records, the callback rate68 for applicants with criminal records was
essentially the same for both races: the white average was 11.1 percent and
the black average was 10.9 percent.69 However, the racial gap in callbacks
increased drastically after ban-the-box legislation was passed.70 After banthe-box implementation, white applicants were 45 percent more likely than
black applicants to receive a callback, compared to being just 7 percent more
likely before the laws.71 In sum, the racial gap in callback rates became six
times larger after ban-the-box legislation went into effect.72
To account for this distinction, Agan and Starr propose two plausible, and
not mutually exclusive, explanations.73 First, “statistical discrimination”
against black men could explain this result; employers treat all black men as
if they have a high probability of possessing a criminal record.74 Secondly,
ban the box could increase benefits for white applicants based on the
stereotype that white men are less likely to have criminal convictions.75
In another study, researchers tested the effect of ban-the-box policies on
black and Hispanic men.76 The study concluded that ban-the-box laws
decrease the probability of being employed by 5.1 percent for young, lowskilled black men and 2.9 percent for young, low-skilled Hispanic men.77
The authors hypothesized that when information on criminal records is
available and used, employers are more likely to hire low-skilled black and
Hispanic men without criminal records.78 When criminal records are
prohibited, however, employers use race as a proxy for criminal records.79
66. See id. at 2–3, 12.
67. See id. at 11. To identify racially distinctive names, the authors used birth certificate
data for babies born between 1989 and 1996, which encompasses the age group of the
applicants. To qualify as a racially distinctive name, the name had to meet a threshold
requirement for the percentage of babies given that name who were black or non-Hispanic
white. See id. at 12–13.
68. A callback is defined as a voicemail or email from an employer requesting that the
applicant contact the employer or requesting an interview. Id. at 15.
69. See id. at 17.
70. See id. at 33.
71. See id.
72. See id.
73. See id. at 34.
74. See id.
75. See id. at 34–35.
76. See Doleac & Hansen, supra note 8, at 4.
77. Id. at 26. The authors focused on low-skilled workers because, on average, exoffenders have less education and job experience than nonoffenders. See id. at 3–4.
78. See id. at 26.
79. See id. at 8. The authors cite additional studies that found a similar effect with other
employment information. For example, when employers mandated drug tests for employees,
black employment rates increased by 7 to 30 percent. See id. at 9. Relatedly, another study
concluded that bans on credit checks decreased job-finding rates for black applicants by 7 to
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Minority applicants, therefore, are denied a chance to even get their foot in
the door because employers assume that they have criminal records, even
when they do not.
The outcomes of these studies are problematic: while they show that banthe-box laws are helping formerly incarcerated individuals,80 they also show
that employers are discriminating against minority applicants by guessing the
probability of the presence of a criminal record based on race.81 If the goal
of employment discrimination legislation is to increase opportunities not only
for formerly incarcerated individuals but also for minorities without criminal
records, then ban-the-box legislation undermines this goal.
B. Employment Discrimination Doctrine
in the Age of Unconscious Discrimination
The decline in hiring people of color in jurisdictions that have
implemented ban-the-box legislation is concerning. Agan and Starr have
attributed the decline to unconscious discrimination: when criminal records
are unavailable, employers implicitly use race as a proxy for whether an
applicant may have a criminal record.82 For this reason, it is imperative to
understand the differences between conscious and unconscious
discrimination and how unconscious discrimination flourishes in
jurisdictions with ban-the-box laws.
1. Unconscious Discrimination
in the Employment Realm
In the late 1980s, sociologists and legal scholars began studying
discrimination, mainly focusing on the distinctions between conscious and
Conscious discrimination is typically
unconscious discrimination.83
manifested through inappropriate remarks or outward biased treatment of a
certain group.84 Unconscious discrimination, however, is based on cultural
or emotional factors that might be unknown to the person.85
More recently, scholars have proposed that there are two separate systems
of cognitive operations that influence how individuals react to different
proxies for race and gender.86 In the system aligned with conscious
discrimination, the deductions are “deliberative, calculative, [and] slower.”87
16 percent. See id. Both of these studies support the idea that when employers have less
information, they are more likely to make negative assumptions about black men. See id.
80. See Agan & Starr, supra note 8, at 32.
81. See id. at 33–38.
82. See id. at 37–38.
83. See Franita Tolson, The Boundaries of Litigating Unconscious Discrimination: FirmBased Remedies in Response to a Hostile Judiciary, 33 DEL. J. CORP. L. 347, 359 (2008) (citing
Charles R. Lawrence, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious
Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 323 (1987)).
84. See id.
85. See id.
86. See Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, The Law of Implicit Bias, 94 CALIF. L. REV.
969, 973–76 (2006).
87. Id. at 974.
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Conversely, our unconscious system is rapid and error prone, where
individuals make quick assumptions based on limited information.88 Often,
these assumptions are based on cognitive shortcuts that rely on stereotypes,
and therefore, the deductions made under this system are often inaccurate.89
Moreover, researchers hypothesized factors that make unconscious
discrimination more likely to occur. First, as the acceptance of overt racism
in the workplace has decreased, unconscious discrimination has become
more common than conscious discrimination.90 Some researchers believe
that employers are less likely to use race as a factor in their decisions when
their decision could be seen as visibly racist.91 For example, when
participants in a study were asked to evaluate applicants, they chose the
highly qualified black candidate 91 percent of the time over a clearly less
qualified white candidate.92 However, when the black candidate’s
qualifications were lowered but were still satisfactory, the black candidate
was recommended only 45 percent of the time, while the white candidate
with the same credentials was recommended 76 percent of the time.93
According to the researchers of this study, decision makers are much more
likely to discriminate where they have more discretion and can justify their
behavior on the basis of something other than race, such as less-robust
credentials.94 That is, individuals are likely to select the black candidate
when he is clearly the most qualified because the decision maker has less
discretion. But as soon as the candidate’s qualifications are lowered,
individuals are much less likely to select the black candidate, even over the
less qualified white candidate, because they can justify the decision on
something other than race.
Additionally, studies show that when individuals have less information
about a person, they are more likely to use cognitive shortcuts to assume
information about that person.95 When employers do not have access to
information, they will rely on generalizations about gender or racial groups
to make assumptions about an applicant’s productivity and employability.96
Thus, when a group is associated with higher productivity, an individual in
that group is more likely to get the job based on these generalizations.97

88. See id. at 974–75.
89. See id.
90. See Tolson, supra note 83, at 356–58.
91. See John F. Dovidio et al., Why Can’t We Just Get Along?: Interpersonal Biases and
Interracial Distrust, 8 CULTURAL DIVERSITY & ETHNIC MINORITY PSYCHOL. 88, 90–92 (2002).
92. See id. at 92.
93. See id.
94. See id. at 90; see also L. Song Richardson & Philip Atiba Goff, Implicit Racial Bias
in Public Defender Triage, 122 YALE L.J. 2626, 2628 (2013) (noting that implicit biases are
particularly influential where decision making is highly discretionary).
95. See Hanming Fang & Andrea Moro, Theories of Statistical Discrimination and
Affirmative Action: A Survey, in HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL ECONOMICS 133, 137 (J. Benhabib et
al. eds., 2011).
96. See id. at 135–40 (analyzing numerous studies and economic models to show how
employers use assumptions about productivity and risk to hire applicants when there is limited
information).
97. See id.
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This theory applies to other contexts as well. For example, one study found
that a ban on credit checks reduced employment rates for African American
and young job applicants.98 Conversely, legislation that enabled employers
to conduct drug testing increased employment rates for blacks; the largest
positive effect was seen with low-skilled black males.99 Both of these studies
further suggest that when employers have less information about job
applicants, they are more likely to use racial assumptions in their hiring
decisions.
2. Unconscious Discrimination
and Ban-the-Box Laws
Postimplementation studies of ban-the-box laws suggest that unconscious
discrimination is prevalent during the hiring process.100 While some
employers may intentionally use race to influence their hiring decisions, it is
more likely that employers are unaware of their biases as they are sifting
through job applications.101 Analyses of implicit aptitude tests102 (IATs)
show that unconscious attitudes and stereotypes are widespread across
demographic groups.103 Furthermore, research has shown that the implicit
association between African Americans and crime is particularly strong and
influential on cognitive processing.104
Therefore, in Agan and Starr’s ban-the-box study, employers were likely
subconsciously using race as a proxy for criminal records when they are
With limited
prohibited from accessing criminal information.105
information, employers rely on other implicit shortcuts, such as the names of
the applicants, to predict criminality when making hiring decisions.106
Although this data demonstrates that extensive unconscious discrimination
is harming minority job applicants without criminal records, it would be
unwise to eliminate ban-the-box laws because research also establishes that
the laws are indeed assisting formerly incarcerated individuals to reenter the
job market.107 However, legal scholars must ensure that there are sufficient
98. See Robert Clifford & Daniel Shoag, “No More Credit Score”: Employment Credit
Check Bans and Signal Substitution 20 (Harvard Kennedy Sch., Working Paper No. RWP16008, 2016), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2746642 [https://perma.cc/
VM2B-CYNN].
99. See Abigail Wozniak, Discrimination and the Effects of Drug Testing on Black
Employment, 98 REV. ECON. & STAT. 548, 557–65 (2015).
100. See Agan & Starr, supra note 8, at 38.
101. See id. (“Lab experiments on implicit biases have consistently found that most
Americans make such assumptions subconsciously.”); see also Brian A. Nosek et al.,
Pervasiveness and Correlates of Implicit Attitudes and Stereotypes, 2007 EUR. REV. SOC.
PSYCHOL. 1, 40–43.
102. See Nosek et al., supra note 101, at 7–8.
103. See id. at 10–22.
104. See Jennifer L. Eberhardt et al., Seeing Black: Race, Crime, and Visual Processing,
87 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 876, 889 (2004).
105. See Agan & Starr, supra note 8, at 34–35.
106. See id. at 37.
107. See id. at 37–40 (discussing how the policy implications associated with ban-the-box
laws can be balanced to maximize interests).
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legal remedies available for rejected job applicants who suspect unconscious
racial discrimination in the hiring process.
C. Current Title VII Employment Discrimination Remedies
One way to reduce discriminatory employment practices is to allow
plaintiffs to bring lawsuits. Job applicants without criminal records who
suspect they have been discriminated against based on race may file an
employment discrimination lawsuit under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964. Title VII allows individuals to sue employers for discrimination on the
basis of race, gender, religion, or national origin.108 Section 703 of Title VII
provides:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer—
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or discharge any individual, or otherwise
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants from
employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any
individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his
status as an employee, because of such individual’s race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin.109

Based on the Court’s interpretation of this statute, there are two types of
employment discrimination claims: (1) disparate impact and (2) disparate
treatment.110 Disparate impact applies to situations where an employment
practice has a discriminatory effect on a certain group of applicants or
employees.111 Disparate treatment applies when an employer treats an
individual differently because of his membership in a protected class.112
If rejected applicants can successfully sue employers, then employers will
be forced to recognize their implicit racism and will be less likely to
discriminate. Accordingly, the negative consequences of ban-the-box laws
will be mitigated, and formerly incarcerated individuals will have greater
chances of securing jobs without reducing employment opportunities for
minorities without criminal records.
1. Disparate Impact Claims
According to Title VII, it is unlawful to use an employment practice that
has a discriminatory effect on individuals of a certain race, gender, or national
origin.113 Disparate impact claims are filed to challenge a seemingly neutral
employment practice that has a significant negative impact on a protected

108. Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 703(a), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2012).
109. Id.
110. See Melissa Hart, Subjective Decisionmaking and Unconscious Discrimination, 56
ALA. L. REV. 741, 750 (2005).
111. See id.
112. See id. at 750–51.
113. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a).
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group.114 While disparate impact claims could theoretically provide relief
for minorities without criminal records, these claims are extremely hard to
win for two reasons.
First, courts impose onerous evidentiary requirements on plaintiffs
bringing disparate impact claims.115 For example, courts have held that the
disparate impact data must be from the precise geographical area in issue.116
Furthermore, the data must demonstrate that the practice had a negative effect
on the particular applicant pool in question, not simply a theoretical pool of
applicants.117 This evidence is typically very hard to obtain, especially for
plaintiffs alleging unconscious discrimination.118 These specific and
extensive requirements have led one scholar to conclude that “the heightened
standard courts are applying often serves as a death knell for disparate impact
actions.”119
Second, there is apparent judicial resistance to recognizing subjective
decision making, such as when employers choose to hire an applicant, as a
challengeable employment practice.120 Disparate impact claims typically
challenge a seemingly objective policy, such as minimum height
requirements121 or arbitrary benchmarks for scores on intelligence tests.122
A number of courts have held that subjective decision making itself cannot
be considered a policy that discriminates.123 Absent an employment practice
that has a discriminatory effect, courts refuse to apply a disparate impact
analysis.124 Accordingly, disparate impact claims are unlikely to be a source
of relief for a rejected applicant because the applicant would be challenging

114. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431–32 (1971) (holding that the
company’s employment practice of requiring high school completion and a satisfactory score
on a general intelligence test was in violation of Title VII where the policy had no correlation
with successful performance of the job and reduced promotions for African American
employees).
115. See Hart, supra note 110, at 783–84.
116. See, e.g., Hill v. U.S. Postal Serv., 522 F. Supp. 1283, 1302–03 (S.D.N.Y. 1981)
(holding that the plaintiff failed to meet the burden of proof because the proffered data did not
cover the precise geographic area in issue).
117. EEOC v. Carolina Freight Carriers Corp., 723 F. Supp. 734 (S.D. Fla. 1989) (holding
that the EEOC’s statistical analysis comparing the expected and actual employment patterns
for truck driver positions in the specific city of the discrimination was insufficient and that a
successful claim includes data showing the national origin and race of the relevant labor
market, as well as the specific applicant data that showed the exact number of Latino drivers
who were precluded because of the employment practice).
118. See Smith, supra note 22, at 207. Even if plaintiffs can present this proof, employers
can use the business necessity defense, which conditions that the employer’s hiring policy is
valid if it is shown to be fundamental to securing appropriate employees for the business.
Courts are very sympathetic to a company’s business necessity. See Griggs, 401 U.S. at 430
(concluding that Title VII did not purport to give employment without regard to
qualifications).
119. Smith, supra note 22, at 207.
120. See Hart, supra note 110, at 783.
121. See Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 332 (1977).
122. See Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431–32.
123. See Hart, supra note 110, at 783.
124. See id.
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a subjective hiring decision.125 Therefore, disparate impact lawsuits are not
a practical option for individuals adversely affected by ban-the-box laws.
2. Disparate Treatment
and the McDonnell Douglas Framework
Disparate treatment claims, the focus of this Note, are brought when there
is alleged discrimination occurring in specific employment decisions.126
Under Title VII, rejected job applicants can sue based on the belief that they
were individually wronged when the employer refused to hire them because
of their race, color, gender, religion, or national origin despite being
qualified.127 Most employment discrimination lawsuits are brought by
individuals asserting disparate treatment claims.128
In a disparate treatment lawsuit, plaintiffs can present either direct or
circumstantial evidence to prove the employment discrimination.129 For
example, if the employer states “only a man should be hired for this job,” a
rejected female applicant would have direct evidence that she was not hired
because of her gender. However, more frequently, the plaintiff must rely on
circumstantial evidence to establish discrimination.130
In 1973, the U.S. Supreme Court developed a model for disparate
treatment cases with circumstantial evidence that shifts evidentiary burdens
from the applicant to the employer and then back again.131 This method, first
established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,132 is referred to as the
McDonnell Douglas framework.133
According to the framework, the plaintiff must first establish the prima
facie elements of the disparate treatment case.134 The prima facie elements
for failure to hire claims are that (1) the plaintiff falls within a protected class,
(2) the plaintiff was qualified for the work for which he or she applied, (3)
the plaintiff was not hired, and (4) the employer in question continued to look
for others with the same qualifications or hired someone with the same or
lesser qualifications who was not in the protected class.135
The burden on the plaintiff of establishing a prima facie disparate
treatment case is not meant to be onerous.136 The plaintiff merely has the
125. See id. (“The judicially imposed standards for prevailing in a disparate impact case
have become so onerous that plaintiffs may be making the extremely sensible judgment that
they will be unable to prevail on these claims.”).
126. See id. at 750–51.
127. See Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 703(a), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2012).
128. See Hart, supra note 110, at 750–71.
129. See id. at 750.
130. See id. at 751.
131. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 800 (1973) (“The critical issue
before us concerns the order and allocation of proof in a private, non-class action challenging
employment discrimination.”).
132. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
133. See, e.g., Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 258 (1981) (discussing
the Court’s application of the McDonnell Douglas framework).
134. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802.
135. See id.
136. See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253.
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initial burden of showing that it is more likely than not that the employer’s
actions were the result of discrimination.137 Additionally, the McDonnell
Douglas framework is intended to be flexible, as the facts of each disparate
treatment claim will vary.138 If the plaintiff meets the prima facie burden,
this creates a presumption that the employer unlawfully discriminated against
the employee or job applicant.139
Once the plaintiff establishes the prima facie case, the burden shifts to the
employer to give a lawful reason for the rejection of the applicant.140 This is
a burden of production, not persuasion.141 In Texas Department of
Community Affairs v. Burdine,142 the Supreme Court concluded that the
employer’s burden at this stage is to articulate a legitimate reason to create a
triable issue of fact.143 The employer does not need to prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that the articulated reason was, in fact, the true
motivation behind the decisions.144 Therefore, if the employer articulates a
legitimate nondiscriminatory explanation for not hiring the applicant, the
burden shifts back to the plaintiff without further analysis.145 In addition, if
this happens, the original presumption of discrimination created by the
successful prima facie case is rebutted.146
If the burden shifts back to the rejected job applicant to prove that the
employer’s articulated nondiscriminatory reasons are actually a pretext for
discrimination, the factual inquiry moves to a higher level of specificity,
forcing the plaintiff to produce additional information beyond the prima facie
case.147 To meet this higher standard, the plaintiff must present some
evidence from which a fact-finder could reasonably ascertain that (1) the
employer’s proffered legitimate reason is false or (2) a discriminatory reason
was “more likely than not a motivating or determinative cause of the
employer’s action.”148 The plaintiff may point to implausibility and
inconsistencies in the employer’s reasons.149 Additionally, the plaintiff may
use comparative evidence to show the discrepancies between the treatment
of individuals within the protected class and those outside of that group.150
137. See Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 576 (1978).
138. See id. at 575 (explaining that McDonnell Douglas was not intended to establish an
inflexible rule).
139. See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254.
140. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802.
141. See Smith v. City of Allentown, 589 F.3d 684, 690 (3d Cir. 2009).
142. 450 U.S. 248 (1981).
143. See id. at 257.
144. See id.
145. See id.
146. See Craig Hunter King, Employment Discrimination: The Burden of Proof, 13 S.U.
L. REV. 91, 97 (1986) (“It is unfortunate for the plaintiff that a satisfactory explanation by the
defendant destroys the legally mandatory inference of discrimination arising from the
plaintiff’s initial evidence.”).
147. See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 255.
148. Fuentes v. Perskie, 32 F.3d 759, 764 (3d Cir. 1994).
149. Id. at 765.
150. See King, supra note 146, at 98. For example, evidence showing that a similarly
situated white employee was treated more favorably than an African American employee can
be sufficient to establish pretext. See id.
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This requirement to prove the true intent of the employer is often thought to
be the largest barrier to proving discrimination.
As Part II demonstrates, the McDonnell Douglas framework is not as
plaintiff friendly as it appears.151 Over time, courts have manipulated it to
such a degree that it has become increasingly easier for employers to escape
liability and almost impossible for plaintiffs alleging hiring discrimination to
gain relief.152
II. IS THERE ANY RELIEF AVAILABLE?:
UNWORKABLE OPTIONS UNDER TITLE VII
This part examines how the McDonnell Douglas framework provides an
unbeatable obstacle for individuals who are alleging implicit discrimination
in failure-to-hire claims, such as minorities without criminal records in banthe-box jurisdictions. Some circuits have used an alternate scheme—a
mixed-motive framework—that attempts to account for unconscious
discrimination, but many other circuits have been reluctant to do so. This
part compares the traditional McDonnell Douglas framework and the newer
mixed-motive framework and shows how the widespread application of the
mixed-motive framework may strengthen plaintiffs’ success in employment
discrimination claims.
However, this part also demonstrates that failure-to-hire claims are still
virtually unwinnable by plaintiffs, despite the potential improvement of a
mixed-motive framework. It describes additional obstacles confronting
rejected job applicants who suspect that discrimination caused the adverse
hiring decision.
This part conducts this analysis to unveil the deficiencies of employment
discrimination claims, which are more problematic than ever because of banthe-box legislation’s unintended detrimental effect on minorities without
criminal records. Without strong laws to protect individuals affected by
unconscious discrimination, ban-the-box legislation is more harmful than
productive.153
A. The McDonnell Douglas Single Motive Framework:
The Death Knell of Failure-to-Hire Claims
In McDonnell Douglas, the Supreme Court constructed an analytical
framework for disparate treatment cases where the evidence is
circumstantial.154 Under this framework, plaintiffs have to prove that the
discriminatory pretext is the employer’s only motivation for the adverse
hiring decision. The Supreme Court has continuously articulated the
requirement of a singular explanation for the decision, concluding, “[T]he
district court must decide which party’s explanation of the employer’s

151.
152.
153.
154.

See infra Part II.A.
See Tolson, supra note 83, at 366–68.
See, e.g., Agan & Starr, supra note 8; Doleac & Hanson, supra note 8.
See supra Part I.C.2.
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motivation it believes.”155 There is no room for both explanations. Although
an employer may be partially motivated by discrimination, as long as the
employer also articulates a nondiscriminatory reason for the decision that
persuades the fact-finder, the plaintiff cannot establish a pretext.156
Accordingly, the McDonnell Douglas framework is known as the singlemotive framework because the framework only permits one motivation for
the employer’s alleged discrimination.157
Thus, the fact-finder must weigh the discriminatory reason against the
proffered legitimate reason for the adverse employment action.
Problematically, courts have seemingly put their thumb on the scale in favor
of the employer and have gone to great lengths to ensure that the fact-finder
discovers a plausible nondiscriminatory reason for the employment action.
In St. Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks,158 the Supreme Court held that the factfinder could continue to look for nondiscriminatory explanations for the
employer’s actions even after the plaintiff had shown the employer’s original
reason was pretextual.159 In Hicks, a black plaintiff was being subjected to
repeated and severe disciplinary actions under a new supervisor.160
Subsequently, Hicks was fired after threatening his supervisor during an
argument.161 Hicks provided sufficient evidence to show that other
employees did not receive the same disciplinary actions.162 In fact, other
employees who committed more serious violations were treated more
leniently than Hicks.163 Although the Court considered this evidence
sufficient to prove pretext, the Court stated that the trier of fact was free to
look for another nondiscriminatory reason to account for Hicks’s termination,
such as the threat or the argument.164 If the trier of fact believes that the
employer was more likely motivated by a nondiscriminatory reason rather
than a discriminatory one, the trier of fact could disregard the original
evidence of pretext and find for the employer.
Legal scholars have interpreted the Court’s decision as a “pretext plus
rule,” where the plaintiff has to prove that the original proffered reason was
pretext and then subsequently discredit any additional nondiscriminatory
motives for the adverse decision.165 Later, in Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing
Products, Inc.,166 the Supreme Court stated that although the plaintiff’s
evidence of a prima facie case and pretext is enough to support liability, this

155. U.S. Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 716 (1983).
156. See id.
157. See, e.g., Steven J. Kaminshine, Disparate Treatment as a Theory of Discrimination:
The Need for a Restatement, Not a Revolution, 2 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 1, 4 (2005).
158. 509 U.S. 502 (1993).
159. Id. at 511.
160. Id. at 504–05.
161. Id. at 504. The legitimate nondiscriminatory reason was the severity and the
accumulation of Hicks’s rules violations. See id. at 507.
162. See id. at 508.
163. See id.
164. See id. at 511.
165. See Tolson, supra note 83, at 382.
166. 530 U.S. 133 (2000).
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evidence does not mandate a victory for the plaintiff.167 These judicial
interpretations have essentially eliminated any likelihood of success for an
employment discrimination plaintiff because an employer has multiple
chances to refute a plaintiff’s already demanding evidentiary burden.168
This single-motive framework and the pretext plus rule particularly harm
plaintiffs alleging implicit bias. The framework fails to account for the fact
that an employer motivated by discrimination will almost always have other
reasons to explain the decision.169 This is especially true for unconscious
discrimination, which is more likely to occur where the decision maker can
attribute her decision to some reason other than race.170 Because many
people do not want to admit that they harbor racial prejudices, individuals
exercising implicit bias will rationalize their decision on the basis of another
nondiscriminatory reason.171 Therefore, an analytical framework that gives
the court freedom to “discover” another decision-making factor protects
employers who implicitly discriminate because it allows the employers to
assert multiple reasons for the discriminatory decision.172 Employers are let
off the hook because the single-motive framework means that the fact-finder
can pick just one of the many reasons as the true motivation.173
Furthermore, in unconscious discrimination cases, the employer’s business
decision almost always wins because the implicit bias is seen as less credible
than the employer’s proffered legitimate reason.174 The single-motive
framework does not provide much hope for plaintiffs asserting unconscious
discrimination. Thus, rejected job applicants who suspect that discrimination
played a role in their rejection cannot bring successful claims against the
employer. Therefore, in ban-the-box jurisdictions that employ the singlemotive framework, there is no incentive for employers to address implicit
bias. Additionally, there is no legal relief for minorities who are experiencing
heightened discrimination due to ban-the-box laws.
B. The Mixed-Motive Framework:
A Glimmer of Hope in a Few Jurisdictions
Scholars argued that, as discrimination in the workplace changed, the
McDonnell Douglas single-motive framework was insufficient to address
unconscious decision making for the reasons suggested above.175 In 1989,
the Supreme Court in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins176 recognized the
possibility that an employer’s actions may be motivated by multiple factors,
concluding, “Title VII meant to condemn even those decisions based on a
167. See id. at 146–48; see also Kaminshine, supra note 157, at 14.
168. See Kaminshine, supra note 157, at 14.
169. See Tolson, supra note 83, at 384.
170. See Dovidio et al., supra note 91, at 90–92; see also discussion supra Part I.B.1.
171. See Hart, supra note 110, at 747–48.
172. See Tolson, supra note 83, at 384.
173. See U.S. Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 716 (1983).
174. See Tolson, supra note 83, at 385.
175. See, e.g., D. Don Welch, Removing Discriminatory Barriers: Basing Disparate
Treatment Analysis on Motive Rather Than Intent, 60 S. CAL. L. REV. 733, 776–78 (1987).
176. 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
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mixture of legitimate and illegitimate considerations.”177 The majority in
Price Waterhouse, however, limited the “mixed-motive” analysis to cases
with direct evidence,178 drastically reducing the holding’s scope.179 The
McDonnell Douglas framework would still be applied to any case with
circumstantial evidence.180
In response, Congress amended section 703 of Title VII in 1991 to read:
“An unlawful employment practice is established when the complaining
party demonstrates that race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a
motivating factor for any employment practice, even though other factors
also motivated the practice.”181 While some scholars and judges believed
this amendment invalidated the legal distinction between circumstantial and
direct evidence, many disagreed and much debate ensued over the
interpretation of the amendment.182
1. The Desert Palace Doctrine
In 2003, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide whether the direct
evidence requirement constructed in Price Waterhouse was permitted under
the new statutory language.183 The Court in Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa184
held that there was no direct evidence requirement within the statutory text
and, therefore, direct evidence was not necessary for a mixed-motive jury
instruction.185
In Desert Palace, a female employee sued her employer after being fired
from her position as a warehouse worker.186 Throughout her employment,
Catharina Costa experienced a number of problems with the company’s
management, resulting in escalating disciplinary actions.187 Costa was fired
after getting into a physical altercation with a male coworker.188 The male
coworker was not fired, according to the employer, because he had a clean
disciplinary record.189 At trial, Costa provided evidence that she was
177. Id. at 241.
178. Id. For examples of what constitutes direct evidence, see id. at 272 (O’Connor, J.,
concurring), where the Court concluded that direct evidence was presented where an
employer’s evaluations of the plaintiff overtly referred to her failure to conform to gender
stereotypes as a reason for not allowing her to be partner, and Taylor v. Runyon, 175 F.3d 861,
866 (11th Cir. 1999), where the court found that an employer’s statement that a female plaintiff
was not promoted because a male coworker needed the promotion more to support his wife
and children constituted direct evidence.
179. See Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 270–71 (O’Connor, J., concurring). Justice Sandra
Day O’Connor’s concurrence was required to form a majority in this case, and it heavily
influenced how lower courts applied this opinion. See Natalie Bucciarelli Pedersen, A Legal
Framework for Uncovering Implicit Bias, 79 U. CIN. L. REV. 97, 115 nn.77–78 (2010).
180. See Pedersen, supra note 179, at 115.
181. Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 703(a), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2012) (emphasis added).
182. See Pedersen, supra note 179, at 116–17.
183. See Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90 (2003).
184. 539 U.S. 90 (2003).
185. See id. at 101–02.
186. See id. at 95–96.
187. Id. at 95.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 95–96.
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continuously disciplined more harshly than her male coworkers.190 The jury
was given instructions based on the mixed-motive framework.191 The
instructions were as follows:
You have heard evidence that the defendant’s treatment of the plaintiff was
motivated by the plaintiff’s sex and also by other lawful reasons. If you
find that the plaintiff’s sex was a motivating factor in the defendant’s
treatment of the plaintiff, the plaintiff is entitled to your verdict, even if you
find that the defendant’s conduct was also motivated by a lawful reason.192

The employer objected to this jury instruction because Costa had not
provided direct evidence and, therefore, should only receive the singlemotive framework.193 The district court overruled this objection and the jury
held in favor of Costa.194
The Supreme Court held that the district court correctly applied the
statutory language.195 According to the Court, the language unambiguously
states that a plaintiff must demonstrate only that the employer unlawfully
considered race, gender, or national origin in making an employment
decision.196 The Court held that the statute could not require a single-motive
framework, because the statute did not distinguish between cases based on
direct versus circumstantial evidence.197
This ruling appeared to be a remarkable triumph for employment
discrimination plaintiffs.198 On first impression, the decision allowed the
mixed-motive framework to replace the McDonnell Douglas framework in
disparate treatment cases with direct or circumstantial evidence.199 Thus,
this interpretation would render the McDonnell Douglas single-motive
framework dead; the mixed-motive framework would be the only analysis
allowed.200 Instead, however, confusion and an apparent reluctance to apply
this new standard followed, resulting in a split among circuit courts.201
2. The Desert Palace Split
The circuit courts have interpreted the Desert Palace holding in conflicting
ways, leading to vastly different applications and results throughout the lower
courts. The difference in interpretation is over when the mixed-motive
framework applies.202 Some circuits apply the mixed-motive framework to
190. Id. at 96.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 97.
194. Id.
195. See id. at 101–02.
196. See id. at 98.
197. See id. at 98–99.
198. See Pedersen, supra note 179, at 116.
199. See Desert Palace, Inc., 539 U.S. at 98–99.
200. See id.; see also Jeffrey A. Van Detta, “Le Roi Est Mort; Vive Le Roi!”: An Essay
on the Quiet Demise of McDonnell Douglas and the Transformation of Every Title VII Case
After Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa into a “Mixed-Motives” Case, 52 DRAKE L. REV. 71 (2003).
201. See Pedersen, supra note 179, at 117.
202. See id. at 122–25.
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every stage of the case from summary judgment through jury instructions at
trial.203 By contrast, the Eighth Circuit interprets the Desert Palace holding
to be limited to jury instructions.204 Therefore, courts in the Eighth Circuit
rejected the application of Desert Palace at the summary judgment stage and
employed the McDonnell Douglas analysis instead.205
Summary judgment is a crucial stage for all litigants, but this phase is
especially critical for employment discrimination plaintiffs.206 Nearly threequarters of all federal employment discrimination lawsuits are resolved in
whole or in part on summary judgment, which is the highest summary
judgment rate out of all litigation categories.207 This elevated rate matters
for a few important reasons. First, it means that most employment
discrimination plaintiffs do not have an opportunity to present their story and
to feel as if they have received fair judicial process.208 Furthermore,
summary judgment proceedings influence the amount and likelihood of a
settlement offer.209 Additionally, judges, not juries, rule on summary
judgment and have been shown to defer to employers’ business judgment at
higher rates than juries.210 As a result, this discrepancy has substantial effects
on the outcomes of employment discrimination lawsuits.211
a. The Eighth Circuit Approach
The Eighth Circuit has held that Desert Palace has no effect on the
McDonnell Douglas framework at the summary judgment phase.212 Under
this interpretation, the mixed-motive analysis is applied only during posttrial
jury instruction.213 Accordingly, the plaintiff can survive the summary
judgment phase only if the plaintiff can show that race was the true
motivating factor behind the employer’s decision rather than the employer’s
legitimate business reason.214 In Griffith v. City of Des Moines,215 the court
concluded that evidence of additional motives and their effect on the
plaintiff’s claim are trial issues.216 At summary judgment, the only inquiry
203. See, e.g., Nicholson v. Hyannis Air Serv., Inc., 580 F.3d 1116, 1122 (9th Cir. 2009).
204. See, e.g., Sallis v. Univ. of Minn., 408 F.3d 470 (8th Cir. 2005); Griffith v. City of
Des Moines, 387 F.3d 733, 735 (8th Cir. 2004).
205. See id.
206. See JOE CECIL & GEORGE CORT, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., ESTIMATES OF SUMMARY
JUDGMENT ACTIVITY IN FISCAL YEAR 2006, at 2 (2007), http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/
lookup/sujufy06.pdf/$file/sujufy06.pdf [https://perma.cc/W7G2-Y7XB].
207. See id. at 9–10.
208. See Pedersen, supra note 179, at 119–20.
209. See id. at 120; see also Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Dangers of Summary Judgment:
Gender and Federal Civil Litigation, 59 RUTGERS L. REV. 705, 715–16 (2007).
210. See Wendy Parker, Lessons in Losing: Race Discrimination in Employment, 81
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 889, 927 (2006) (summarizing scholarly works that critique judges’
evaluative function in employment discrimination lawsuits).
211. See Pedersen, supra note 179, at 119.
212. See, e.g., Griffith v. City of Des Moines, 387 F.3d 733, 735 (8th Cir. 2004).
213. See id.
214. See Pedersen, supra note 179, at 123 (citing Gilbert v. Des Moines Area Cmty. Coll.,
495 F.3d 906 (8th Cir. 2007)).
215. 387 F.3d 733 (8th Cir. 2004).
216. See id. at 735.
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is whether the plaintiff has adequate evidence to show that the employer was
motivated by discriminatory factors and not a legitimate nondiscriminatory
reason.217
Following this interpretation, the Eighth Circuit continues to use the
single-motive framework in the summary judgment stage. In Sallis v.
University of Minnesota,218 the Eighth Circuit affirmed summary judgment
for the employer, stating that the plaintiff’s claim failed under McDonnell
Douglas because he could not show that university’s reason for not hiring
him was pretextual.219 The plaintiff, Sallis, alleged that he was denied a
position at the university on the basis of race.220 Sallis presented evidence
that the supervisor used racial epithets and openly complained about
employees of a certain national origin.221 The court was unconvinced and
noted that Sallis failed to show that “the actual motivating factor was race
discrimination.”222 The Eighth Circuit was unwilling to consider the racebased comments as a possible motivating factor behind the decision not to
hire the plaintiff. Therefore, the plaintiff’s case was dismissed.223
b. The Ninth Circuit Approach
The Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits have held that the Desert
Palace framework applies at the summary judgment phase.224 Consequently,
plaintiffs will survive the summary judgment stage with evidence that race,
gender, or national origin may have been a motivating factor in the
employer’s adverse action.
In a case with similar facts to Sallis, the Ninth Circuit reversed the district
court’s grant of summary judgment to the employer.225 In this case, the
female plaintiff was suspended from her position as a pilot and sued her
employer alleging sex discrimination.226 The plaintiff presented facts that
other male pilots had made sex-related remarks and complained that the
plaintiff had a “machismo attitude.”227 While the airline provided facts to
show that there were sufficient concerns about the plaintiff’s flying
abilities,228 there was also some evidence that male pilots with similar
217. Id. at 736 (“Thus, we conclude that Desert Palace had no impact on prior Eighth
Circuit summary judgment decisions.”).
218. 408 F.3d 470 (8th Cir. 2005).
219. See id. at 475–76.
220. See id. at 473.
221. See id.
222. Id. at 476.
223. See id.
224. See, e.g., Ondricko v. MGM Grand Detroit, LLC, 689 F.3d 642, 649–51 (6th Cir.
2012); Nicholson v. Hyannis Air Serv., Inc., 580 F.3d 1116, 1120 (9th Cir. 2009); DominguezCurry v. Nev. Transp. Dep’t, 424 F.3d 1027, 1031–34 (9th Cir. 2005) (reversing summary
judgment for the employer where the female plaintiff was less qualified than the person
eventually hired for the position, but the employer made remarks, such as “women should only
be in subservient positions.”).
225. See Nicholson, 580 F.3d at 1120.
226. See id.
227. Id.
228. See id. at 1121.
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deficiencies in ability were given additional remedial training instead of
being suspended.229 The Ninth Circuit held that “very little evidence is
necessary to raise a genuine issue of fact regarding an employer’s motive”
because the ultimate question must be resolved through an in-depth inquiry
conducted by the fact-finder with a full record.230 Therefore, the district
court’s grant of summary judgment to the employer was improper because
the plaintiff alleged the minimal evidence necessary.231
In Metoyer v. Chassman,232 the plaintiff sued her employer for race
discrimination under Title VII after she was fired from her position at the
Screen Actors Guild.233 The plaintiff, Patricia Metoyer, alleged that many of
her supervisors at the Screen Actors Guild had made blatantly racist
comments.234 Other minority employees had also complained about racial
discrimination.235 In response, the employer presented evidence that
Metoyer inappropriately used grant funds of over $30,000, which Metoyer
admitted. Still, the court held that the district court erred in granting summary
judgment for the employer because the plaintiff proffered evidence that race
may have been a motivating factor in the employer’s decision in addition to
the defendant’s legitimate reason for terminating her employment.236 Thus,
summary judgment was denied because the court could not rule out the
possibility that race played a role in the decision.237
From these two cases, it is evident that the Ninth Circuit is using a mixedmotive framework at the summary judgment stage, allowing plaintiffs to
proceed with the case where there is some evidence that race, gender, or
national origin may be one possible motivating factor.238 This approach is
especially crucial for individuals alleging unconscious discrimination in the
hiring process because it increases the detection of implicit bias.239 For
reasons stated above, unconscious discrimination typically occurs in contexts
where the decision maker has another reason to justify the decision.240 The
Ninth Circuit approach allows this discrimination to factor into the legal
outcome instead of being passed over in favor of the employer’s
nondiscriminatory reason.241 Thus, if courts are willing to consider evidence
of possible discrimination, even where the employer states a legitimate
229. See id. at 1122.
230. Id. at 1127–28.
231. See id. at 1128.
232. 504 F.3d 919 (9th Cir. 2007).
233. Id.
234. See id. at 925.
235. See id. at 924–25. For example, in response to complaints that African Americans
were kept in the low-paying jobs, high-level employees stated that they needed to “keep an
eye on them because black people like to party and eat and don’t do their work.” Id. at 925.
Furthermore, the director of human resources explicitly told Metoyer that it is very unlikely
that there will ever be a person of color on senior staff. Id. at 924.
236. See id. at 939.
237. See id. at 942.
238. See id. at 939–40; Dominguez-Curry v. Nev. Transp. Dep’t, 424 F.3d 1027, 1042 (9th
Cir. 2005).
239. See Pedersen, supra note 179, at 141.
240. See Dovidio et al., supra note 91, at 90–92; Hart, supra note 110, at 747.
241. See, e.g., Metoyer, 504 F.3d at 939–40.
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business reason, plaintiffs alleging hiring discrimination have an opportunity
to present their case.242
C. The Additional Evidentiary Problems
in Hiring Discrimination Claims
In addition to the grueling task of proving unconscious discrimination,
minorities who are discriminated against in the hiring phase encounter other
evidentiary problems specific to failure-to-hire claims. First, a plaintiff
alleging hiring discrimination rarely has much information about the
employer because of the limited interactions between the employer and the
rejected applicant.243 In fact, the applicant may have never interacted with
the employer beyond a brief interview. Therefore, it is more challenging—
if not impossible—to prove that unlawful discrimination played a role in the
hiring decision.
For example, imagine an African American man who applies for a job at a
local store. He is qualified for the job with a high school diploma and
previous work experience in the industry. He interviews with the manager
but is not offered the job. The manager subsequently hires a white man for
the position. The African American man believes he was not given the job
because of his race; he says he knows because of the manager’s tone and the
way the other employees looked at him.244 But he will not be able to prove
it.245 Under the single-motive framework, he can establish the prima facie
case, but the employer needs only one legitimate reason why the applicant
was not a good fit and the case is over.246 Even under the mixed-motive
framework, the likelihood of success is small without any more evidence of
(even subtle) discrimination, such as the manager’s racist remarks or
differential treatment of the store’s current employees based on race.247
Although discrimination may be a motivating factor, this evidence is hard to
acquire for failure-to-hire claims because there is little opportunity to observe
this type of bias.248 Thus, despite the mixed-motive analysis, this plaintiff is
likely to lose.
Secondly, in addition to the lack of proof, plaintiffs alleging hiring
discrimination are unlikely to prevail because courts are extremely

242. See, e.g., Stegall v. Citadel Broad. Co., 350 F.3d 1061, 1073 (9th Cir. 2003) (“Our
opinion seeks only to allow [the plaintiff] the opportunity to prove [the employer’s]
motivations for terminating her.”).
243. See Linda Hamilton Krieger & Susan T. Fiske, Behavioral Realism in Employment
Discrimination Law: Implicit Bias and Disparate Treatment, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 997, 1059–
60 (2006) (listing judicially accepted evidence for proving hiring discrimination).
244. See Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias
Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161,
1214–16 (1995) (describing many of her clients’ observable and subtle reasons that they
believed they were discriminated against).
245. See id.
246. See supra Part II.A.
247. See, e.g., Metoyer v. Chassman, 504 F.3d 919 (9th Cir. 2007); Dominguez-Curry v.
Nev. Transp. Dep’t, 424 F.3d 1027 (9th Cir. 2005).
248. See Krieger, supra note 244, at 1162.

2830

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 85

deferential to employers’ hiring decisions.249 For example, in Wright v.
Western Electric Co.,250 Curtis Wright, an African American man, applied
for a job as an electronic technician and was rejected.251 The court held that
Wright was qualified for the position because he had two years of electronic
technician education and eleven years of experience in the field.252 In
response, however, the employer stated that Wright’s answers in his
interviews showed an inadequate level of knowledge for the position.253 The
court, using the McDonnell Douglas framework, ruled in favor of the
employer.254 The court was entirely unwilling to consider that race
motivated the hiring decisions, despite evidence that Wright was highly
qualified for the job when compared to the applicants that were eventually
hired.255 Instead, the court relied on the employer’s statement that the
plaintiff appeared to have insufficient knowledge during the interview.256
This decision suggests that the court would have decided similarly under the
mixed-motive framework because of the court’s extreme deference to the
employer’s reason.
Similarly, in Kelley v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.,257 the employer stated
that the applicant had a very poor interview performance, which led to the
decision to not hire him.258 Although the employee argued that he performed
well in the interview and that the reason was simply a pretext for
discrimination, the court viewed the employer’s assertion that the interview
was poor as a fact.259 While this deference to the employer is consistent with
the reasonable belief that employers can evaluate and reject job applicants
regardless of how the applicant evaluates his own employability, this concept
makes these claims even harder to win.
III. KEEPING THE BOX BANNED
AND REVAMPING THE CURRENT DOCTRINE
Throughout the past few decades, legal scholars have noted a great
deficiency in employment discrimination doctrine, especially concerning
unconscious discrimination.260 Now, postimplementation studies of ban-the249. See, e.g., Kelley v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 220 F.3d 1174, 1178 (10th Cir.
2000).
250. 664 F.2d 959 (5th Cir. 1981).
251. See id. at 961–62.
252. See id.
253. See id. at 964.
254. See id. at 965.
255. See id. Western Electric eventually hired six technicians, none of whom were African
American, and required five of them to attend additional training to bring their performance
up to the desired level. See id.
256. See id. at 964–65.
257. 220 F.3d 1174 (10th Cir. 2000).
258. See id. at 1178; see also Furr v. Seagate Tech., Inc., 82 F.3d 980, 988 (10th Cir. 1996)
(“It is the manager’s perception of the employee’s performance that is relevant, not plaintiff’s
subjective evaluation of his own relative performance.”).
259. See Kelley, 220 F.3d at 1178 (holding that the employee’s perception of the interview
is completely irrelevant).
260. See supra Part II.A.
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box laws have presented new data about the prevalence of unconscious
discrimination in the hiring process, specifically toward minority males.261
However, the studies also show that ban-the-box policies are valuable for
formerly incarcerated individuals seeking employment.262 While some
advocates are calling for the removal of ban-the-box laws to eliminate the
harmful effects on applicants without criminal histories,263 the better solution
is to use the unintended consequence of ban-the-box laws as motivation to
finally reform hiring discrimination doctrine.
Lawmakers must provide a sufficient remedy to applicants who are
discriminated against during the hiring process. Currently, the success rate
for plaintiffs bringing disparate impact or disparate treatment claims is
dismal.264 One study shows that employment discrimination plaintiffs win
about 15 percent of the time in federal court, compared to plaintiffs in all
other civil cases whose win rate is about 51 percent.265 Consequently, some
plaintiffs’ attorneys are hesitant to bring employment discrimination lawsuits
because the chances of winning are so slim.266
If legislatures, legal scholars, and judges can make employment
discrimination litigation a viable option for applicants, formerly incarcerated
individuals and minority males without criminal records can be treated fairly
in the hiring process. To mitigate the consequences of ban the box, the
winnability of these lawsuits must be strengthened through (1) the application
of that the mixed-motive framework to all stages of a lawsuit and (2)
increased access to reliable information for plaintiffs alleging racial
discrimination.
A. Applying the Mixed-Motive Framework
to All Phases of the Case
As many scholars have argued, the mixed-motive framework should be
applied to all stages of litigation.267 Unlike the mixed-motive framework,
the single-motive framework relies on two inaccurate assumptions about the
way people make employment decisions: that decisions are based solely on

261. See supra Part I.A.4.
262. See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
263. See, e.g., Jennifer L. Doleac, “Ban the Box” Does More Harm Than Good,
BROOKINGS (May 31, 2016), https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/ban-the-box-does-moreharm-than-good/ [https://perma.cc/CR74-7KEN].
264. See supra notes 206–07 and accompanying text; see also Tolson, supra note 83, at
366–69 (discussing evidence of a judicial bias against employment discrimination plaintiffs,
including statistics that plaintiffs disproportionately lose more on appeal).
265. Nathan Koppel, Job-Discrimination Cases Tend to Fare Poorly in Federal Court,
WALL ST. J. (Feb. 19, 2009), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB123500883048618747
(summarizing studies of plaintiff success in civil cases from 1979 through 2006)
[https://perma.cc/U4PH-J5QW].
266. See id. (“‘We will no longer take individual employment-discrimination cases,
because there’s such a high likelihood of losing,’ New York plaintiffs’ attorney Joe Whatley
Jr. says.”).
267. See, e.g., Hart, supra note 110, at 762; Pedersen, supra note 179, at 141.
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one factor and that people are aware of their decisions.268 As such, the singlemotive framework undermines important policy goals.269
The mixed-motive framework, however, accurately reflects our
multifaceted decision-making processes.270 Very few decisions are made
based on a single reason; most decisions are derived from a variety of
factors.271 This is especially true when implicit bias is involved because
decision makers justify their unconscious biases with other reasons.272 Yet,
the single-motive framework relies on monocausality, or the idea that people
rely on one factor when making decisions.273 This is reflected throughout
the single-motive framework, including the requirement of identifying the
“real reason” for the adverse decision in the pretext phase.274 Where there is
no room for another plausible explanation, the plaintiff is left to convince the
fact-finder that the employer’s seemingly legitimate reason is actually a
“sham” or “cover up” for the employer’s true discriminatory motive.275
Employment discrimination attorney Linda Krieger puts it bluntly,
explaining that to win she “would have to prove that the [employer] was a
racist and a liar.”276
In actuality, the employer can truthfully articulate a nondiscriminatory
reason for not hiring the plaintiff and still have an unconscious discriminatory
motive.277 The mixed motive accounts for this and enables the plaintiff to
argue that, despite a well-intentioned decision-making process, the employer
was partially motivated by an unconscious bias.278 Accordingly, this
framework not only reduces acrimony but also increases the potential that the
fact-finder will recognize the role of implicit bias in the adverse decision.279
The mixed-motive framework also accounts for the likelihood that the
employer is unaware of the underlying factors behind its decision.280 There
is substantial evidence that well-intentioned people categorize and stereotype
through an automatic unconscious process.281 Research shows that people
are highly inaccurate when identifying the effects of certain factors, such as
stereotypes, on their evaluations or choices.282 Additionally, when people

268. See Krieger, supra note 244, at 1214–16.
269. See id. at 1223–41.
270. See id.
271. See id.
272. See id.; see also supra notes 91–94 and accompanying text.
273. See Krieger, supra note 244, at 1223.
274. See id.
275. See, e.g., Acrey v. Am. Sheep Indus. Ass’n, 981 F.2d 1569, 1580–81 (10th Cir. 1992)
(holding that the plaintiff did not prove that the employer’s reason was a pretext for
discrimination); Williams v. Valentec Kisco, Inc., 964 F.2d 723, 726 (8th Cir. 1992).
276. See Krieger, supra note 244, at 1163.
277. See id. at 1223.
278. See Pedersen, supra note 179, at 101–02.
279. See id. at 141.
280. See Krieger, supra note 244, at 1214–16.
281. See id.
282. Richard E. Nisbett & Timothy DeCamp Wilson, Telling More Than We Can Know:
Verbal Reports on Mental Processes, 84 PSYCHOL. REV. 231, 233–48 (1977).
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are asked to explain why they made a certain decision, they misattribute or
fabricate the factors they based their decision on.283
The single-motive doctrine fails to recognize that decision makers most
likely cannot accurately identify why they made a particular decision,
especially if implicit bias is playing a role in the decision-making process.284
Thus, an analysis that rests on the assumption that employers are rational
actors who are aware of their unconscious motives is entirely ineffective.285
Moreover, this framework distorts the truth and relies on information that we
know to be unreliable, such as an employer’s account of how he came to a
certain hiring decision.286 Although it retains some of these flaws, the mixedmotive framework more accurately accounts for the way people remember
their decision-making processes by allowing the fact-finder to consider
multiple reasons for a decision. In this way, the fact-finder can acknowledge
that unconscious discrimination may play a role in an employer’s cognitive
processes, even where other motivating factors are involved.
Lastly, the mixed-motive framework better serves the policy goals behind
employment discrimination law.287 Laws are enacted to encourage socially
desirable actions and curtail socially undesirable behaviors.288 However,
when a law is ineffective or unclear, individuals who are supposed to comply
with the law cannot successfully do so.289 Thus, if lawmakers want
employers to curtail discrimination during the hiring process, the law must
be interpreted and enforced in this manner.290
Moreover, the mixed-motive analysis must be applied at all stages if
lawmakers want to reduce unconscious employment discrimination. Under
the mixed-motive framework, plaintiffs have a stronger legal threat against
employers.291 As a result, employers may become aware of the prevalence
of implicit bias and put systems in place to protect themselves against
unconscious discrimination litigation.292 Undoubtedly, this solution will not
eliminate implicit racism and sexism in our society. However, unless the law
targets and punishes those who unconsciously discriminate, the chances of
reducing implicit bias is drastically minimized.
B. Increasing Information
The analytical framework is only one part of the solution. Even where the
mixed-motive framework is applied, plaintiffs asserting unconscious hiring
discrimination often lack sufficient proof.293 A large number of these cases
283. See id. at 247–48 (finding that individuals tend to select an inaccurate but plausible
explanation from memory rather than actually examining their cognitive process).
284. See Krieger, supra note 244, at 1167–69.
285. See id.
286. See Nisbett & Wilson, supra note 282, at 247–48.
287. See Krieger, supra note 244, at 1238–41.
288. See id. at 1239.
289. See id.
290. See id.
291. See Pedersen, supra note 179, at 101–02.
292. See id.
293. See King, supra note 146, at 101–02; see also supra Part II.C.
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fail, or are never even filed, because the rejected applicant requires more
information about the employer’s hiring process and trends.294 While the
mixed-motive framework does help alleviate some of the evidentiary
burdens,295 increasing the availability of employment information will equip
plaintiffs with more of the necessary evidence. Furthermore, if employers
know this information is being collected and released, they may think more
carefully about their employment decisions.296
One of the ways this can be done is through a stronger commitment to the
collection of employment data and to regulatory oversight and enforcement.
Currently, under section 709 of Title VII, employers are required to keep
records relevant to determinations of whether unlawful employment practices
are occurring and make reports from these records.297 To comply with this
mandate, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) has
established requirements for employers.298 Each year, employers must file a
form, known as the Equal Employment Opportunity Form (EEO-1).299
Under its authority, the EEOC requires employers to indicate each
employee’s job description, gender, and race on the EEO-1 form.300
Additionally, the EEOC mandates that employers keep records regarding
hiring, promotion, demotion, termination, and compensation rates.301 The
EEOC also has the authority to require employers to keep records regarding
the hiring process, including data regarding the race and gender of their
applicants, when necessary to accomplish the goals of Title VII.302
In practice, the EEO-1 form appears to be a useful tool for advocates
fighting against employment discrimination. The effectiveness of the EEO1 data collection requires government enforcement.303 While this process
was successful in the early 1980s,304 the government commitment to regulate

294. See King, supra note 146, at 101–02.
295. See White v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 533 F.3d 381, 400 (6th Cir. 2008) (“This burden
of producing some evidence in support of a mixed-motive claim is not onerous and should
preclude sending the case to the jury only where the record is devoid of evidence that could
reasonably be construed to support the plaintiff’s claim.”).
296. See Pedersen, supra note 179, at 146–47.
297. Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 709(a), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-8(c) (2012).
298. See 29 C.F.R. § 1602.1-14 (2016).
299. See id. § 1602.7.
300. See Agency Information Collection Activities; Notice of Submission for OMB
Review, Final Comment Request: Revision of the Employer Information Report (EEO-1), 81
Fed. Reg. 45,479, 45,479 (July 11, 2016); see also Press Release, U.S. Equal Emp’t
Opportunity Comm’n, EEOC to Collect Summary Pay Data (Sept. 29, 2016),
https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/newsroom/release/9-29-16.cfm (announcing the adoption of the
revised EEO-1 form described in the final comment request) [https://perma.cc/99EM-TYCF].
301. See 29 C.F.R. § 1602.14.
302. See id. § 1602.19 (“The Commission reserves the right to require reports, other than
that designated . . . whenever, in its judgment, special or supplemental reports are necessary
to accomplish the purpose of title VII . . . .”).
303. See generally Alexandra Kalev & Frank Dobbin, Enforcement of Civil Rights Law in
Private Workplaces: The Effects of Compliance Reviews and Lawsuits Over Time, 31 LAW &
SOC. INQUIRY 855 (2006).
304. This data collection is a promising platform to build off of but does not currently do
enough to provide information to rejected applicants. See id. at 883.
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employers through this data has declined since the Reagan administration.305
Without government commitment to audit employers and ensure compliance
with the EEOC requirements, the EEO-1 forms will be ineffective.306
While data collection and the accompanying commitment to audit and
analyze that data is a promising starting point, the current regulatory
framework does not do enough to provide information to rejected applicants.
An expansion of data collection and oversight would supply employment
discrimination litigants with essential evidence and would serve as an
incentive for employers to critically monitor their hiring decisions.
1. Evidence for Hiring Discrimination Plaintiffs
If employment discrimination plaintiffs have the opportunity to acquire
and use reliable information to establish that discrimination was one of the
motivating factors in the adverse employment decision, these individuals
would have more success. EEO-1 forms could potentially provide plaintiffs
with critical information to use as evidence when alleging hiring
discrimination.307 As such, the EEOC should require employers to do more.
For example, the EEOC should use its authority to mandate that employers
maintain data regarding the demographics of their job applicants and their
hiring procedures, including how they reviewed each document and how they
decided whether the applicant was a good fit.308
While this may appear to be an onerous burden, many employers likely
already have some internal tracking system for applications that would make
this fairly easy to do. For example, the company could click a box after the
application was reviewed or an interview was conducted that would indicate
why the applicant was not hired, such as insufficient work experience,
unsatisfactory knowledge of the field, or incompatible attitude. This
information, although it may be a valid reason for rejection, still provides
additional knowledge about why the applicant was rejected. Furthermore,
the EEOC can audit employers’ data and discern, for example, whether
applicants of certain races or genders are consistently rejected for insufficient
work experience when other applicants are being hired with the same work
experience. In this way, this information collected by the EEOC can arm
employment discrimination plaintiffs with necessary evidence and increase
their chances of winning unconscious discrimination claims.

305. See id. at 863–65. The compliance reviews in the 1980s and beyond had less positive
effects. See id. at 883.
306. See id.
307. It is important to note that while the EEOC is prohibited from making EEO-1 forms
public, legal scholars have been able to access and study these documents. See generally
ALFRED W. BLUMROSEN & RUTH G. BLUMROSEN, THE REALITY OF INTENTIONAL JOB
DISCRIMINATION IN METROPOLITAN AMERICA—1999 (2002), http://www.eeo1.com/1999_
nr.htm [https://perma.cc/XG2K-R48E].
308. See 29 C.F.R. § 1602.19 (2016).
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2. Impetus for Employer Self-Regulation
In addition to creating evidence for employment discrimination plaintiffs,
this data collection is essential to changing the way employers think about
hiring discrimination. Some scholars suggest that this type of compliance
oversight would more effectively alter employment practices than litigation
itself.309 If employers are aware that data are being collected, they will be
more likely to think about the real reasons behind their hiring decisions.310
As research shows, increased attention to decision-making processes can lead
to greater recognition that stereotyping may be a reason for a decision.311
Therefore, requiring employers to pay more attention to their motivations
behind a hiring decision can lead to increased awareness of implicit bias,
which is an essential step to eliminate bias.312
Ideally, this newfound awareness would mean that companies could, and
would, self-regulate their unconscious discrimination and change their
employment practices. Legal scholars believe that employers have a wide
array of options to eliminate unconscious bias, including diversity hiring
initiatives and gender or ethnicity sensitivity training.313 Additionally,
employers have the ability to consistently monitor and evaluate their
workplace statistics and require their employees to appraise their implicit
biases through the free IAT test.314 In fact, many employers have started to
use the insights from implicit bias tests to inform their hiring practices.315
Employers committed to eliminating unconscious bias, as enforced by the
threat of litigation and the EEOC’s oversight, are well equipped and may be
in the best position to reach this goal.
CONCLUSION
With almost 700,000 Americans being released from prison every year,
increasing employment opportunities for formerly incarcerated individuals is
an essential piece of criminal justice reform.316 In an attempt to combat
hiring discrimination against formerly incarcerated individuals, many
lawmakers have advocated and passed ban-the-box legislation.317 Although
postimplementation studies have found these laws are helping formerly
incarcerated individuals, the legislation is increasing unconscious
discrimination against minority males without criminal records.318
Problematically, employment discrimination litigation currently does not
309. See Tolson, supra note 83, at 396–413.
310. See Pedersen, supra note 179, at 101–02.
311. See id.
312. See id.
313. See Tolson, supra note 83, at 413, 417.
314. See id. at 419.
315. See Tanya Katerí Hernández, One Path for “Post-Racial” Employment
Discrimination Cases—The Implicit Association Test Research as Social Framework
Evidence, 32 J.L. & INEQ. 309, 341–43 (2014).
316. See Petersilia, supra note 2, at 657.
317. See supra notes 4–6 and accompanying text.
318. See supra Part I.A.2.
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adequately protect plaintiffs alleging unconscious discrimination, leaving
minority males without criminal records with essentially no legal recourse
against the documented discrimination they face. Accordingly, ban-the-box
laws can only be justified if employment discrimination doctrine provides
individuals adversely affected by the laws with relief.
Therefore, instead of eliminating ban-the-box legislation, lawmakers
should use the negative unintended consequence of ban-the-box laws as
motivation to strengthen employment discrimination doctrine through two
main reforms. The application of the mixed-motive framework to all stages
of litigation, along with an increase in oversight and data collection from the
EEOC, will cause employers to become more aware of the prevalence of
employment discrimination and work to combat unconscious bias in their
hiring processes. Moreover, racial minorities will be able to successfully
gain legal relief for the heightened racial discrimination in ban-the-box
jurisdictions. In this way, the negative unintended consequence of ban-thebox laws can prompt tremendous and positive changes in the fight to reduce
employment discrimination for both formerly incarcerated individuals and
racial minorities.

